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Abstract: This paper analyses post-entry and pre-exit performance of French firms using a dataset 
covering 14 manufacturing industries over the period 1990-2002. The main focus is on market 
selection mechanisms looking at total factor productivity levels of entrants and exitors relative to 
incumbent firms. Entrants are found to outperform incumbents, while exitors are less efficient than 
their surviving counterparts. We nonetheless found key distinguishable features of exit patterns 
between young and mature firms. Young exiting firms do not display productivity disadvantage 
relative to incumbent firms. By contrast, mature exiting firms display large and persistent productivity 
disadvantage relative to their surviving counterparts (shadow of death effect). The determinants of exit 
differ for entrants and incumbents. Productive inefficiency is a key determinant of the exit of mature 
firms but not entrants. 
 
JEL Codes: D24, L11, L60. 
Keywords: entry and exit patterns, firm level data, TFP indexes, market selection 
 1. Introduction 
In market-based economies, firms are continuously subject to market selection forces. At all 
time, firms must make sure to be profitable enough in order to remain on the market. The 
determinants of the relative abilities of firms to survive on competitive markets are diverse 
and complex. In this paper we focus on productive efficiency criteria and investigate if 
productivity differences between firms are a key determinant of their relative ability to 
survive. The link between productive firm heterogeneity and industrial dynamics (entry, exit 
and reallocation of market shares) have successfully been integrated into the standard general 
equilibrium framework (Jovanovic, 1982) which, in turn, helps to discuss the relationship 
between industry characteristics, technology, and firm’s productivity distribution (Ericsson et 
Pakes, 1990, Hopenayn, 1992). These models are now confronting empirical data due to the 
increasing availability of Longitudinal Micro-datasets (LMDs) in a large variety of countries 
(see Bartelsman and Doms 2000 and Tybout 2001 for recent surveys).  
Our paper adds to this literature using a dataset for French Manufacturing firms over the 
period 1990-2002. We compute measures of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for all French 
firms above 20 employees operating in manufacturing industries. We follow the productive 
performance of entering, continuing, and exiting firms over time in order to address the issue 
of the efficiency of market selection mechanisms. On main issue is to investigate to which 
extent efficiency criteria play a similar selection role at different stage of a firm life. Behind 
this hypothesis, lies the idea that several competitive games co-exist within a same courtyard. 
More specifically, the competition that prevails between incumbents and entrants may not 
involve the same selection mechanisms than the competition that prevails among incumbent 
themselves. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature background. Section 
3 discusses issues involved in building our longitudinal data set. In Section 4, we focus on 
young firms and describe the relationship between productivity firm heterogeneity and post-
entry performances. In Section 5, we do a similar exercise on mature firms in describing the 
relationship between productivity firm heterogeneity and pre-exit performances. In Section 6, 
duration models are further developed to investigate how the determinants of the hazard of 
exit vary at different stages of the life of a firm. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Literature background  
Recently, comprehensive and large plant- and firm-level datasets have been made available in 
a large variety of countries to address the issue of the contribution of plant and firm turnover 
to the productivity growth of manufacturing industries. A non-exhaustive list of contributions 
includes Baily et al. (1993), Haltiwanger (1997), Foster et al. (2001) for the United States, 
Griliches and Regev (1995) for Israel, Liu and Tybout (1996) and Eslava et al. (2003) for 
Chile and Colombia, Hahn (2000) and Awe, Chen and Roberts (2001) for South Korea and 
Taiwan, and Nishimura, Nakajima and Kiyota (2005) for Japan. Furthermore, Scarpetta et al. 
(2002) and Bartelsman et al. (2003) provide comparisons of the contribution of turnover to 
productivity growth within 10 countries including France1. From this literature, new stylized 
facts on entry and exit patterns and related implications for the analysis of industrial dynamics 
have emerged. 
Basically, it has been shown that exiting firms were usually concentrated in the lowest 
part of the productivity distribution, suggesting that markets were contributing to aggregate 
productivity in rightly selecting against inefficient firms. Evidence of this natural selection 
mechanism (NSM)2 has been found in a large variety of countries. More surprisingly , such 
evidence has even been found in the case of developing countries, even though sources of 
markets distortion can be thought of as particularly prevalent in those countries (see Tybout 
(2000) for a survey of empirical evidence on the developing World).  
Nonetheless, market selection processes may work more or less efficiently across 
countries, industries and over time depending on a potentially large variety of factors. For 
instance, Scarpetta et al. (2002) argue that, on average, firms tend to exit with better relative 
productivity levels in downturn times and in mature and/or restructuring industries. Nishimura, 
Nakajima and Kiyota (2005) advocate that natural market selection mechanisms no longer 
work in severe recessions as indicated by the fact that, over the last decade in the recessive 
Japanese economy, mature unproductive Japanese firms staid in the market while younger 
efficient ones exited. Awe, Chung and Roberts (2002) compare data for Taiwan and South 
Korea from 1983 to 1993, a period of rapid economic expansion for both those economies. 
They conclude that institutions in Taiwan have, nonetheless, been more effective in 
supporting the market selection process against unproductive firms. Consequently, plant and 
                                                 
1  Others countries are the United States, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands and Portugal. 90 
 
2 Nishimura, Nakajima and Kiyota (2005) refer to economic Darwinism 
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firm turnover have much more contributed to the productivity growth of the Taiwanese 
manufacturing industries compared to the Korean ones.  
Our paper pursues this line of empirical research by reporting new evidence on France. 
It proposes to relate firm productivity (TFP) and entry and exit patterns in French 
manufacturing industries over the 1990-2002 period. In order to organise this empirical 
investigation, we rely on some empirical implications derived from the recent literature on 
stochastic dynamic industry equilibria with heterogeneous firms.  
The starting point of this literature is the seminal paper by Jovanovic (1982). In this 
model of “passive learning” (see also Hopenhayn, 1992), firms are endowed at birth with a 
time invariant profitability parameter, which determines the distribution of its future profit 
stream. A central feature of the model is that a new firm does not know what its relative 
efficiency is (its cost function), but rather discovers it through the process of Bayesian 
learning from its actual post-entry profit realizations. By continually updating such learning, 
the firm decides to expand, contract, or exit. In this model, learning is said to be passive 
because information is obtained as a costless by-product of operating and also because 
learning does not affect the actual productivity of the firm. It simply “reveals” the pre-
determined and time-invariant relative efficiency of the firm. 
By contrast, in “active learning” models such as Ericson and Pakes (1995) (see also 
Olley and Pakes, 1996; and Pakes and Ericson, 1998), it is assumed that the firm knows the 
current value of the parameter that determines the distribution of its profits, but that this value 
changes over time in response to the stochastic outcomes of the firm own investments, and 
those of other actors in the same oligopoly market. The firm grows if successful, shrinks or 
exits if unsuccessful. In this model, learning is said to be active not only because it requires 
specific efforts but also because it allows the firm to improve its relative performance.  
While these two basic models are rich in their implications for firm level dynamics from 
the aggregate point of view, they are very complex dynamical systems. The main purpose of 
Hopenhayn (1992) is to provide a simpler framework by assuming that the perfectly 
competitive industry is in a stationary equilibrium. The model of industry dynamics become 
then more tractable and some interesting analysis of comparative static can be performed. Its 
main prediction is that firm turnover is negatively related to entry costs and, in turn, that low 
firm turnover is correlated with large productivity gaps between exiting and surviving firms. 
However, due to the absence of price competition effects, market size has no effect on entry 
and exit rates. An extension of the model to an imperfectly competitive market with 
monopolistic competition is considered in Asplund and Nocke (2003). The model generates 
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implications of sunk costs and market size on firm exit and the size distribution of surviving 
firms. 
These new theoretical models have started to be confronted to empirical tests in the 
middle on the nineties (i.e. quite contemporaneously with the literature on the micro-
foundations of aggregate productivity growth surveyed above). In particular, Pakes and 
Ericson (1998) study the empirical implications of the passive and active learning models in 
great depth and proposed quite general nonparametric tests of alternative models of firm 
dynamics3; their empirical study (on a eight-year panel of Wisconsin firms) suggests that the 
passive learning model fits the retailing sector well, while manufacturing shows patterns that 
support the existence of active learning. Abbring and Campbell (2004) propose alternative 
tests after accounting for heterogeneity across firms’ pre-entry scale decisions and transitory 
shocks observed only by entrepreneurs, but they do not find any evidence of entrepreneurial 
learning for Texan bars.  
Other papers propose more general comparative analyses encompassing several 
manufacturing industries. The Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1995) paper uses Canadian plant 
level data over the 1970-89 period to investigate to which extent the improvements in the 
performance of any entry cohort are the result of a pure selection process that culls out the 
(pre-determined) most inefficient entrants or of an evolutionary learning process that allows 
survivors to improve their productivity performance relative to incumbent firms. Their main 
conclusion is that both pure selection and evolutionary learning affect post-entry performance, 
but selection per se is a more important contributor to the overall growth of a cohort. 
Using Spanish firm-level data, Farinas and Ruano (2005) test the implications of the 
Hopenayn (1992) model. They find that the productivity distribution of continuing firms 
stochastically dominates the distributions of entering and exiting firms. Moreover, the group 
of failing members of any entry cohort has lower productivity than the group of surviving 
members of the same entry cohort. Finally, they find that the post-entry productivity level of 
entering firms grows more rapidly than the productivity of incumbent firms, although this 
pattern is not always highly significant. This pattern is not solely consistent with a pure 
selection process as the one at work in the Hopenayn (1992) model but may also result from 
learning effects playing a role through investment, exploitation of scale economies, etc.  
Bhattacharjee (2005) proposes an hazard regression model for firm exit, with a 
modification to accommodate age-varying covariate effects, which allows to confront 
                                                 
3 Actually they built their tests in using the fact that the passive learning model differs from from the active 
learning model in that the stochastic process generating the size of a firm is non-ergodic.  
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different theoretical models in a unified framework. More specifically, the proposed hazard 
regression models can accommodate negative effects of initial size that increase to zero with 
age (active learning model), negative initial size effects that may increase with age, but stay 
permanently negative (passive learning model), conditional and unconditional hazard rates 
that decrease with age at higher ages, and adverse effects of macroeconomic shocks that 
decrease with age of the firm. Using UK firm data, they conclude that their dataset is mostly 
consistent with the active learning model as the effect of initial size is significantly negative 
for a young firm and falls to zero with age. 
We propose to investigate these issues further from a French case study by emphasising 
both common and divergent predictions which emerge from the passive and the active 
learning models about post-entry and pre-exit dynamics. Our methodology to compute 
productivity indexes is close to the one used in the Farinas and Ruano (2005) paper. Our 
focus is more in line with the Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1995) paper as we shed some 
lights on the relative importance of pure selection and active learning in shaping post-entry 
patterns. We add however to this paper in extending the analysis to the pre-exit patterns of 
mature firms and in emphasising the role of imperfect competition in shaping both post-entry 
and pre-exit selection processes. Finally, our paper is also close to Bhattacharjee (2005) in 
that we develop duration models and investigate how selection processes impact firms at 
different stages of their life. We however use explicit measures of firm relative productivity 
(and not size as a proxy of efficiency) to discuss the differences in the relative efficiency of 
firms. Finally, in putting the focus on the distinction between young and mature firms we also 
come close to the literature that emphasised the distinction between small and large firms 
(Audrescht, 2005)4.  
3. A comprehensive dataset on French manufacturing firms 
3.1. Data sources 
The firm data set used in this paper is collected by the French Ministry of Industry (SESSI). 
The French Census of Manufacturing (called EAE5) is a unique census collecting information 
about inputs and outputs of all individual firms of more than 20 employees. This census 
allows us to trace quite extensively the performance of firms over time. Compared to the 
existing literature, an interesting feature is that data are directly collected at the firm level, not 
                                                 
4 Farinas and Ruano (2005) also distinguish between large firm and small firms but their underlying theoretical 
model (the Hopenayn (1992) one) rules out any independent impact of the size of the firms on their relative 
performances.   
5 Enquête annuelle d’entreprises 
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at the plant level. This means that we are dealing with firm (not plant) turnover. This has the 
advantage of avoiding potential spurious effects when assessing the specific role of market 
selection for productivity growth. Indeed, a plant closure is never the direct consequence of a 
market selection process. It is the direct consequence of a firm decision. It is likely that a firm 
decides to close a plant because the latter is not productive enough. This selection process is 
not however a pure market selection process. It is internally organized by the firm and then 
depends both on the ability of the firm to restructure and on the capacity of the market to 
constrain firms to get rid of unproductive units. In order to assess properly the contribution of 
market selection (not the ones of firms' internal capabilities) in promoting productivity growth, 
it is therefore better to consider firm turnover and not plant turnover. 
Additional industry-level data, mainly used in productivity computations, come from 
the INSEE database (French System of National Accounts). These data are presented in detail 
in the Annex of this paper. 
3.2. Entry and exit patterns 
We rely on the following standard definition for entrants, continuing and exiting firms: an 
entrant is a firm existing in the reference year t but not in t-1; An exiting firm is a firm 
existing in the reference year t but not in t + 1; A continuing firm is a firm existing in the 
reference year t and t + 1 and t - 16. Applied to our dataset, these definitions induce a few re-
entry phenomena, essentially due to the +20 employees threshold effect7. This effect induces 
an overestimation of firm turnover rates. However, as only the smallest firms in the sample 
are concerned, it may not bias so much the inputs or output-weighted entry and exit rates. 
According to these definitions, the dataset exhibits average firm entry and exit rates of 
about 9 and 10 %, respectively. The firm turnover rate8 averages then 18 % per year with a 
slightly decreasing trend over the period of investigation (see Table 1 & Table 2). These 
numbers are slightly lower than the ones reported for France by Bartelsman, Scarpetta and 
Schivardi (2003). Their firm turnover rate for manufacturing is around 24% by year in the 
period 1989-1994 which ranks France as a relatively high turnover country in comparison 
with other OECD countries. 
                                                 
6 In accordance to the OCDE definition (See Bartelsman Scarpetta and Schivardi (2003)), firms existing only one 
year are considered as “one year firms” and are neither counted as entrants or as exiters.  
7 For instance, a firm decreases its number of workers and goes out of the range of the French census but still 
exists in the market. 
8 The turnover rate is defined as the sum of the entry rate and the exit rate.  
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Table 1. Entry and exit by year 
Year Entrant Continuing Exiting Turnover rate 
1990 1 887 19 351 1 738 18.7 
1991 2 130 19 181 2 057 21.8 
1992 1 683 18 896 2 415 21.7 
1993 1 157 18 295 2 284 18.8 
1994 1 961 17 785 1 667 20.4 
1995 1 511 17 816 1 930 19.3 
1996 1 644 17 679 1 648 18.6 
1997 1 626 17 828 1 495 17.5 
1998 1 374 18 007 1 447 15.7 
1999 1 304 17 911 1 470 15.5 
2000 1 345 17 758 1 457 15.8 
2001 1 464 17 617 1 486 16.7 
Another feature of our dataset, quite in line with the existing literature, is that industries 
significantly differ according to their turnover rates. Table 2 shows the average of annual 
turnover rates for each of our 14 two-digit level industries. There is quite a large variability in 
these numbers across industries with higher firm turnovers occurring in clothing & footwear, 
printing & publishing, and the electrical & electronic equipment and smaller ones in the 
automobile, chemical industries, mineral industries, and metallurgy. 
Table 2. Turnover rate by industry 
 Number of firms Labour 
Industry Entry Exit      Σ Entry Exit      Σ 
Clothing & Footwear 9.2 15.2 24.4 5.1 9.3 14.4
Printing & Publishing 9.2 11.0 20.1 5.4 6.6 12.1
Pharmaceutical 8.1 8.4 16.6 4.3 6.2 10.5
House Equipment 8.3 10.4 18.8 4.8 5.9 10.7
Automobile 7.3 7.1 14.4 7.2 6.6 13.8
Transportation Machinery 8.9 9.4 18.2 5.5 3.5 9.1
Machinery & Mechanical Equip. 9.7 9.8 19.5 5.0 5.5 10.6
Electrical & Electronic Equip. 11.9 12.4 24.2 5.4 5.4 10.8
Mineral 7.6 8.6 16.2 3.9 4.7 8.6
Textile 7.6 10.0 17.6 4.7 6.5 11.3
Wood, Paper & Pulp 8.0 9.0 17.1 4.8 5.8 10.6
Chemical 8.1 7.1 15.2 3.9 3.8 7.8
Metallurgy, Iron & Steel 8.0 7.9 15.9 6.1 5.2 11.3
Electrical & Electronic components 9.5 8.9 18.4 5.2 5.7 10.9
3.3. Productivity measurement 
Following Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) and Good, Nadiri and Sickles (1997), the 
total factor productivity index for firm i at time t is measured in the following way: 
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where denotes the real gross output produced by the firm i at time t using the set of inputs 
 (labour, capital and materials). S is the cost share of input X  in the total cost. The 
symbols with upper bar are corresponding measures for the reference point (the hypothetical 
firm). They are computed as the arithmetic means of the corresponding firm level variables 
over all firms in year t. Subscripts τ and n are indices for time and inputs, respectively. This 
methodology is particularly well suited for comparisons within firm-level panel data sets as it 
guarantees the transitivity of any comparison between two firm-year observations by 
expressing each firm's input and output as deviations from a single reference point for each 
year. 
itY
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The first characteristic our dataset shares with the firm-level productivity literature is 
the degree of heterogeneity among firm’s productivity levels. Table 3 presents several 
measures of this heterogeneity. The first column reports, for each year, the standard deviation 
of productivity levels computed on the whole database. The second column shows the 
difference of the log of productivity for the firm at the 90th percentile and the log of 
productivity for the firm at the 10th percentile (the 90-10 differential). These numbers suggest 
a large variation in productivity. The spread in productivity between the firm at the top decile 
and the one at the first decile is about 70 % for the TFP and around 150 % for labour 
productivity. The 90-50, 50-10 and 95-5 differentials are shown in the next columns. Note 
that all of these productivity spreads are fairly stable over time, suggesting a persistent 
heterogeneity in firm productivity levels. 
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Table 3. Variability in Productivity 
Year St. Dev. 90 - 10 90 - 50 50 - 10 95 - 5 
Total Factor Productivity (LnTFP)   
1990 0.371 0.730 0.462 0.268 1.049 
1991 0.367 0.732 0.452 0.280 1.035 
1992 0.366 0.715 0.438 0.276 1.024 
1993 0.368 0.715 0.436 0.279 1.030 
1994 0.372 0.705 0.431 0.274 1.027 
1995 0.371 0.706 0.439 0.268 1.017 
1996 0.367 0.689 0.421 0.268 1.013 
1997 0.374 0.690 0.425 0.265 1.019 
1998 0.381 0.694 0.431 0.263 1.027 
1999 0.394 0.703 0.434 0.269 1.024 
2000 0.410 0.729 0.463 0.266 1.061 
2001 0.413 0.734 0.466 0.269 1.074 
2002 0.402 0.732 0.465 0.267 1.049 
Labour Productivity (Ln Y/L)    
1990 0.643 1.512 0.788 0.724 2.183 
1991 0.639 1.492 0.776 0.716 2.151 
1992 0.630 1.469 0.782 0.688 2.092 
1993 0.632 1.480 0.780 0.700 2.106 
1994 0.649 1.507 0.802 0.705 2.149 
1995 0.641 1.488 0.803 0.685 2.099 
1996 0.636 1.469 0.800 0.669 2.098 
1997 0.646 1.484 0.816 0.669 2.102 
1998 0.649 1.492 0.821 0.671 2.120 
1999 0.653 1.494 0.818 0.676 2.119 
2000 0.659 1.518 0.843 0.674 2.117 
2001 0.646 1.489 0.826 0.663 2.079 
2002 0.637 1.479 0.829 0.650 2.031 
Note: Standard deviation and percentile differences for LnTFP and LnY/L. 
For some part, this heterogeneity reflects the contrasting performance of French 
manufacturing industries during the 1990-2002 period. Figure 1 below portrays the average 
annual growth rates of the TFP for each of our 14 industries. These productivity indexes are 
computed by aggregating individual TFP indexes as follows: 
I,t i,t i,t
i
ln TFP ln TFP= θ∑       
where  is the share of the ith firm in the overall gross output of the 2-digit level industry to 
which it belongs and lnTFPi,t is the productivity index for firm i. 
i,tθ
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Figure 1. Industry TFP growth (average annual growth rates) 
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Clearly, inter-industries differences contribute to the heterogeneity in firm’s productivity 
distribution. However, they explain only a small part of it. After controlling for the industry, 
firm heterogeneity remains high. This suggests that some firms are intrinsically more 
productive than others and it is worthwhile to investigate further how those differences in 
firms’ productivity relate to entry and exit patterns both at the aggregate (whole 
manufacturing) and at the industry level. 
4. Post-entry performance 
Using the previously emphasised distinction between passive and active learning models of 
industrial dynamics and considering that imperfect competition is likely to prevail on 
manufacturing goods markets, one can identify at least three different types of learning 
involved by entry.  First, entry can reveal to new firms information about their relative 
abilities at birth. If ability at birth is the only source of firm heterogeneity9 , post entry 
selection will induce that only the firms which will reveal themselves to be endowed with 
high enough efficiency levels will survive.  Second, entry can reveal or produce knowledge 
about how to produce more efficiently. If this type of learning is pre-dominant, surviving 
entrants will be the ones which are the most skilled to progress10. These abilities can or 
                                                 
9 This extreme assumption prevails for instance in the Jovanovic 1982 model.  
10 This type of learning is the one which is at work in the Ericson and Pakes (1992) model. It is also emphasised 
in evolutionary models in which new firms are assumed to be less experienced in terms of routines and best 
practices and have to grasp them after entry.  
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cannot be related with initial abilities in relative efficiency (i.e. abilities at birth). Third, entry 
can reveal or produce knowledge about “how to struggle” on imperfect competitive markets. 
If this type of learning is pre-dominant, technological abilities at birth or abilities to catch-up 
best practices after entry are not as important as the ability to face reactive strategies 
developed by powerful incumbent competitors11. According to this view, surviving entrants 
will be the ones which will succeed in overcoming their initial strategic disadvantage relative 
to incumbents firms.  
In this Section, we shed some lights on the relative importance of these three types of 
learning while describing the post-entry performance of new entrants. We proceed in three 
main steps. First, we trace in time the average productivity (TFP) of each entry cohorts 
relative to incumbents firms. Second, we discriminate further between successful and 
unsuccessful entrants and compare their productivity levels not only among themselves but 
also between themselves and the incumbent firms. Finally, we examine how these 
productivity gaps are related to changes in the relative size and profitability for the two types 
of entrants: successful ones and unsuccessful ones. Catch up 
Table 4 summarizes the first step. It traces in time the average productivity of entry 
cohorts relative to incumbents firms. For instance, the first line reports the average 
productivity of the 1990 entry cohort in 1990, 1991, 1992, etc., relative to the productivity of 
incumbent firms in the corresponding year. In this Table, the population of incumbent firms is 
defined as the population of firm born before 1990 and surviving during all the period of 
investigation12. A negative number means that new entrants have a productivity disadvantage 
relative to incumbent firms while a positive number reveals a productivity advantage13.  
                                                 
11 This last type of learning may be especially important if competitive threats from existing firms change along 
the post-entry period. For instance, it can be the case that incumbents also lack from precise information about 
the actual threat the new entrants offer to existing firms. Incumbents may then have to wait after entry and the 
early maturation process to device reactive strategies in order to cope with the new competitive threat due to 
emerging adolescent entrants. 
12 While our investigation focuses on the 1990-2002 period, we can trace back the presence of a firm since 1984.  
13 The relative productivity of entrants is computed in two steps. First, the relative TFP index of each new entrant 
is computed as the difference between individual TFP indexes (measured in log) and the average TFP index of 
their incumbent counterparts (i.e. incumbent firms which belong to the same 2-digit industry). Second, the 
relative productivity of the entry cohort is defined as the un-weighted average of the relative individual TFP 
indexes. 
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Table 4. TFP level of entrants relative to incumbent firms by entry cohort (log difference) 
Cohort 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1990 -0.019 0.023 0.037 0.034 0.042 0.034 0.013 0.02 0.019 0.018 0.013 0.025 0.026
1991  -0.008 0.041 0.05 0.057 0.057 0.06 0.054 0.045 0.035 0.033 0.036 0.028
1992   -0.004 0.034 0.05 0.046 0.038 0.038 0.03 0.017 0.016 0.025 0.027
1993    0.023 0.085 0.086 0.062 0.063 0.062 0.062 0.053 0.053 0.062
1994     -0.001 0.053 0.041 0.039 0.038 0.04 0.042 0.042 0.039
1995      0.045 0.066 0.074 0.062 0.07 0.064 0.061 0.06
1996       0.016 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.04 0.038 0.041
1997        -0.019 -0.001 0.003 0.017 0.029 0.022
1998         0.027 0.06 0.051 0.069 0.055
1999          0.032 0.072 0.08 0.073
2000           0.047 0.061 0.061
2001            0.041 0.055
2002             0.022
Numbers in italics indicate non-significance at 5% level 
The first important result emerging from Table 4 is that new entrants exhibit higher 
productivity records compared to incumbent firms. This result holds for each entry cohort 
from 1990 to 2002 and for almost all years of observation except, times to times, the very first 
year of entry. Moreover, it is noticeable that the few times the difference is negative (for 
instance the first year of the 1992 1994 and 1997 entry cohorts), the difference is not 
significant. In contrast, as soon as the difference turns to be at the advantage of entering firms 
(usually the second year of entry), it is also, almost everywhere, significant at the 0.05 level.  
The observation that new entrants outperform incumbent firms contrasts with the earlier 
paper by Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1995) and with the recent one by Farinas and Ruano 
(2005) despite they use a similar methodology to compute relative productivity indexes. One 
explanation could be that our dataset is restricted to firms employing at least 20 employees. 
We then observe young firms rather than “true” new entrants. Nonetheless, our firm survival 
rates in the first years of existence are quite similar to what is usually found in post-entry 
analyses. Moreover, our results are consistent with other studies as the earlier one by 
Griliches and Regev (1995) on Israelian firms, and also the Dysney, Haskel and Heden (2003) 
study on UK data. This last paper also shows that new entrants outperform continuing firms.   
If the French dataset does not support the idea that entering firms suffer from a 
productivity disadvantage relative to incumbent firms, it is consistent with a vintage 
hypothesis according to which new firms embody better technology than older ones14. 
                                                 
14 The underlying argument behind the vintage hypothesis is that a best practice frontier, which evolves over 
time and which is exogenous to the industry, is exclusively available for new firms (Jovanovic and Greenwood, 
2001; Dwyer, 1998) 
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This interpretation is further suggested in Table 4, as the productivity advantage of new 
firms over incumbents increases with the cohort age. For instance, if one computes the 
average of the productivity advantage of new firms over five years after birth, it is about 
2,9 % for the 5 oldest entry cohorts and about 5,3% for the 5 youngest entry cohorts. 
Moreover, this advantage is statistically significant from the very birth of entrants in the case 
of the 3 youngest entry cohorts (2000, 2001, 2002) and not in the case of the older cohorts. 
The fact that young firms outperform incumbent firms is puzzling for the theory and 
especially for the evolutionary learning view of post-entry selection process according to 
which productivity improvements of entry cohorts are driven by technological or best practice 
catching-up of entering firms. It is also at odds with the idea that new firms cope with a 
productivity disadvantage due to scale inefficiencies. The observation that entrants 
outperform incumbents in terms of productivity is consistent with the idea that incumbents 
benefit from some advantages over entrants. Indeed, despite this productivity disadvantage, 
mature firms do not exit the market. This reveals some degree of imperfect competition on 
French manufacturing good markets.  
Table 4 in itself does not allow further discriminating between a natural selection view 
of post-entry dynamics and a competitive selection view. Indeed, both types of selection 
process can still underlie the productivity improvements of any entry cohort in Table 1. For 
instance, the sharp increase in the relative productivity of entrants just after entry could be 
underlined by an intensive natural selection process against relative inefficient entrants (i.e. 
entrants whose productivity advantage at birth is not high enough to overcome some given 
initial disadvantages). Alternatively, differences in relative productivity at birth between 
entrants may not be as important as their ability to grow enough to cope efficiently with the 
reactive strategies that incumbent firms may put in motion as soon as they have precise 
enough information on the productivity advantage of the new entrants.  
To further discriminate between both views, Table 5 below distinguishes between 
successful entrants (firms which survive more than 5 years) and unsuccessful or failing 
entrants (firms which failed within 5 years after their entry).  
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Table 5. Relative TFP by the number of years after entry (log difference) 
Years E/I SE/I FE/I FE/SE FE/SE (COH) 
1 0.006 0.000 0.011 -0.011 -0.015 
2 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.006 -0.026 
3 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.006 -0.034 
4 0.037 0.034 0.041 0.008 -0.027 
5 0.034 0.036 0.021 -0.013 -0.056 
6 0.034 0.034    
7 0.034 0.034    
8 0.031 0.031    
9 0.026 0.026    
10 0.030 0.030       
E= entrants; I = Incumbents, SE= surviving entrants, FE = failing 
entrants, COH: by cohort 
Numbers in italics indicate non-significance at 5% level 
In this Table, entry cohorts are pooled in order to put the emphasis on general trends in the 
maturation process of new firms. In this perspective, the first Column (E/I) which reports the 
TFP differences between all entrants and incumbent firms, simply resumes the general trend 
which already emerged from Table 4 about each entry cohort. The two next Columns (SE/I 
and FE/I) allow comparing the productivity gaps of, respectively, successful and failing 
entrants relative to incumbent firms. Finally the two last Columns in Table 5 show TFP 
differences between entrants themselves. Simple TFP differences are reported in Column 
FE/SE while TFP differences controlled by cohort are summarized in Column FE/SE (CHO).  
The first important result from Table 5 is that both successful and unsuccessful entrants 
outperform incumbent firms. Moreover, both of them “reveal themselves” to be more 
productive than incumbents as soon as year 2 after entry. Finally, both of them maintain their 
productivity advantage over years 3 and 4. It is only in year 5 (i.e the last year of exit for a 
failing entrants) that the average productivity advantage of unsuccessful entrants over 
incumbent firms fall behind the own advantage of successful entrants.  
This result questions the hypothesis of a harsh pure selection mechanism just after entry. 
Indeed, if such a process was occurring, then one should observe a stronger revealed 
productivity advantage for successful entrants compared to unsuccessful ones. The 
competitive view according to which new firms have to learn how to compete on imperfect 
competitive markets is then the most plausible view in accordance to the basic stylised facts 
that emerges from the first three Columns of Table 5. 
If we turn now to the last Columns, additional insights can be given on the performance 
of successful entrants relative to unsuccessful ones. While no TFP differences emerge at first 
sight (see Column SE/FE), successful entrants reveal themselves to be actually more 
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productive than unsuccessful ones when TFP differences are controlled by the cohort (i.e. 
when the comparison involves only entrants of the same entry-cohort).  
This productivity advantage of successful entrants over unsuccessful entrants may 
indicate that a pure natural selection mechanism is nonetheless at work. As this natural 
selection mechanism is not driven by the market competition with incumbent firms, it has to 
come from elsewhere. One hypothesis is that it comes from the competition that prevails 
between entrants themselves. This hypothesis is further investigated in Duration models in 
Section 7 below.  
In order to go one step further, we also consider in Table 3 the maturation process of 
new entrants looking at their relative growth in terms of employment and profitability. Both 
indexes may give us more insights on the ability of some entrants (the surviving ones) to 
compete successfully against some others (their failing counterparts) and to grow rapidly 
enough to survive to the reactive strategies of incumbents.  
 Table 6a and 6b are built alike Table 5 except that relative profitability and size 
indexes are ratio and not differences. Consequently, a number equal to 1 in this Table (not to 
0 as in Table 5) means identical performance. Once more, entry cohorts are pooled to put the 
emphasis on general trends and successful entrants (SE) versus failing entrants (FE) are 
compared no only among themselves but also between themselves and incumbent firms (I). In 
the last Column, COH means that the relative performance is controlled by the cohort. 
Table 6a reports relative profitability indexes for the different population of firms. At 
the firm level, profitability is measured by the ratio of operating-cash flow on sales. At the 
population level, relative indexes correspond to the un-weighted average of the relative 
individual indexes.  
While the profitability of entrants as a whole (E) apparently follow a regular catching-
up process towards the profitability level of incumbents firms (1 means equal performance), 
the pictures changes radically when one discriminates between the two sub-populations of 
successful entrants (SE) and failing entrants (FE).  
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Table 6. Relative performances by the number of years after entry (ratios) 
Table 6a. Relative Profitability 
Years E/I SE/I FE/I FE/SE FE/SE (COH) 
1 -21.285 -9.944 -29.302 -25.990 -0.938 
2 0.536 0.931 0.257 0.268 0.068 
3 0.608 0.878 0.303 0.413 0.210 
4 0.805 0.884 0.649 0.618 0.349 
5 0.908 0.921 0.848 0.687 0.241 
6 0.898 0.898    
7 0.930 0.930    
8 0.997 0.997    
9 1.042 1.042    
10 1.033 1.033       
Table 6b. Relative Employment 
Years E/I SE/I FE/I FE/SE FE/SE (COH) 
1 0.470 0.514 0.438 0.783 0.753 
2 0.485 0.534 0.450 0.795 0.729 
3 0.539 0.555 0.520 0.904 0.777 
4 0.552 0.569 0.520 0.891 0.807 
5 0.562 0.573 0.515 0.877 0.736 
6 0.574 0.574    
7 0.586 0.586    
8 0.632 0.632    
9 0.660 0.660    
10 0.677 0.677       
E= entrants; I = Incumbents, SE= surviving entrants, FE = failing 
entrants, COH: by cohort 
Numbers in italics indicate non-significance at 5% level 
On the one hand, successful entrants catch up quite instantaneously to the profitability level of 
incumbent firms. On the other hand, failing entrants also catch up but at a much slower rate. 
Note that the mechanism underlying the catching up process of the FE population is clearly 
due to a selection process (i.e. the exit of the least profitable firms within 3 years after entry). 
Unsuccessful entrants that survive until age 4 and 5 do not exhibit similar weak relative 
performances (65 and 88 % of the profitability of incumbent firms respectively). This 
suggests that those firms were catching up, not falling behind, but this process wasn’t strong 
or fast enough to allow them to survive to the competition of the rest (young surviving firms 
and incumbents).  
Table 6b reports the relative employment levels of the different population of firms. 
Once more, the dynamics of E/I is a catching-up dynamics. Note however, that new entrants 
remains relatively small compared to incumbent firms even 10 years after their entry. This 
feature is quite consistent with the existing literature on post-entry performance especially the 
one focusing on European countries. In contrast, successful US entrants are characterised by 
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much higher growth rates after entry (see Bartelsman, Schivardi and Scarpetta, 2005 for a 
recent comparative analysis of firm demography between Europe and US). 
If we now consider the sub-population of SE and FE, two main results emerge. First, it 
appears that initial size of failing entrants is significantly smaller than the initial size of 
successful entrants. This may indicate that failing entrants suffer somehow from their relative 
smaller size and that this occurs despite their size disadvantage does not translate into a 
productivity disadvantage relative to their incumbent counterparts. Note, nonetheless, that the 
relative smallness of FE relative to SE is positively correlated with a productivity 
disadvantage. The second important result is that FE experience lower growth rates compared 
to SE but still follow a catching up process towards the employment level of incumbent firms. 
Once more, this leads us to conclude that FE do not survive mainly because they do not grow 
fast enough to struggle efficiently against their incumbent counterparts.  
In summary, the analysis of post-entry performances on French manufacturing goods 
industries reveals that market selection processes are complex. They do not simply resume to 
a natural selection process 15  according to which new entrants exit when they reveal 
themselves not able to reach the minimum productivity level required to become an 
incumbent firm. Moreover, different competitive games seem to co-exist between the 
different actors in the market. Specifically, while the competition between entrants and 
incumbents clearly involve something else than a pure selection mechanism (i.e. a selection 
only based on productivity differentials), the competition among entrants themselves seems to 
be more directly tied to differences in productive efficiency.  
5.  Pre-exit performances of mature firms.  
In this Section, we take advantage of the time series dimension of our data set in order to 
investigate about the pre-exit performance of mature firms. If exit cohorts exhibit lower 
performance than their surviving counterparts in the year of market exit, one can wonder 
about how this phenomenon is achieved, i.e. how exit cohorts performance evolve in the years 
prior to exit. Griliches and Regev (1995) pointed out the existence of what they called a 
“shadow of death” effect which refers to the observation that a performance gap between 
exiting and surviving firms exists in the years before the exiting year. Few studies are 
addressing that issue and they can even reach contradicting results (see Wagner 1999 and 
Almus, 2002 on German data sets). Most of those empirical studies are addressing that 
shadow of death effect by using the evolution of employment growth rate as the main 
                                                 
15 Also called pure selection in terminology is used by Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman 1995.  
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indicator. We pursue this investigation in looking at two performance indicators beyond 
size/employment, namely TFP and profitability. At least, labour productivity is also 
documented in the Tables further but mainly as a sort of control variable.    
Let us start the discussion by Table 7 which displays the relative TFP performance of 
exiting cohorts as, instead of employment growth rates, we are considering TFP as a more 
informative performance indicator.  
The reference population in each Column are firms of more than five years that are in 
the data base on the overall period (from 1990 to 2001).  Then, each line of numbers 
expresses the evolution of the relative TFP difference between each exit cohort (from 1990 to 
2001) and that population of incumbents.  
 
Table 7. Pre-exit Performance of Exiting Firms (relative TFP) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1990 -0.014            
1991 -0.026 -0.044           
1992 -0.031 -0.038 -0.032          
1993 -0.014 -0.037 -0.019 -0.016         
1994 0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.024 -0.023        
1995 -0.004 -0.005 -0.015 -0.021 -0.034 -0.024       
1996 0.013 0.018 0.016 0.007 -0.003 -0.008 -0.037      
1997 -0.001 0.005 0.006 -0.007 -0.027 -0.042 -0.042 -0.044     
1998 0.004 0.000 -0.009 -0.018 -0.016 -0.021 -0.029 -0.056 -0.065    
1999 0.017 0.012 -0.001 0.004 -0.008 -0.003 -0.015 -0.024 -0.039 -0.051   
2000 0.005 -0.011 -0.012 -0.015 -0.025 -0.024 -0.036 -0.024 -0.037 -0.056 -0.057  
2001 0.029 0.024 0.005 0.007 0.008 -0.003 -0.014 -0.031 -0.037 -0.035 -0.036 -0.045
Numbers in italics indicate non-significance at 5% level 
There are two major results. The one is that all exit cohorts are less performing than the 
surviving firms far beyond the exit year. Except the 1996 exit cohort for which that lower 
performance is appearing only three years before the exit date, that relative TFP differential 
occurs far before the exit date (even ten years before for the 2000 exit cohort). The other is 
that this observation is significant in most of the cohorts not only at the exit date but in the 
years prior to exit. Moreover, that gap tends to gradually increase when we get closer to the 
exit date. In that respect, as far as TFP is concerned, we found the existence of a shadow of 
death effect in almost all exit cohorts. These results are quite similar to those exhibited in 
Kiyota (2005).The hypothesis that exiting firms perform lower productivity than the surviving 
ones not only the year of the exit but also some times before exit is almost confirmed over the 
overall period (1990-2001).  
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Now, let us improve that result by adding in the discussion two other performance 
indicators, size and profitability. Here, we pooled the exiting firms and develop a population 
analysis comparing their relative performance to the surviving firms (again the more-than five 
years firms in the sample). 
 
Table 8. TFP, Profitability and Size differences by number of years prior to exit 
Prior to exit 
(in Years) TFP (log) P (lev) S (lev) LP (log)
10 0.015 0.990 1.101 -0.070 
9 0.004 0.902 1.030 -0.063 
8 0.003 0.910 0.950 -0.053 
7 -0.002 0.853 0.901 -0.048 
6 -0.003 0.797 0.911 -0.055 
5 -0.006 0.799 0.834 -0.055 
4 -0.009 0.750 0.793 -0.066 
3 -0.017 0.645 0.737 -0.089 
2 -0.026 0.548 0.665 -0.109 
1 -0.033 0.391 0.621 -0.119 
0 -0.036 0.235 0.564 -0.122 
Numbers in italics indicate non-significance at 5% level 
A remarkable feature occurs which is the quite continuous decrease in the relative 
performance of exiting firms for each of the performance indicators in use. Relative TFP is 
gradually decreasing along the 10 years period before the exit date; it becomes negative seven 
years before the exit date even if this result is only significant five years before the exit date 
(bold numbers). Relative profitability and size are continuously decreasing and those 
indicators are significant 9 years and 6 years before the exit date, respectively. Moreover, the 
magnitude of relative profitability is quite higher than the ones of the two other performance 
indicators, and that magnitude also increases during the five years period prior to exit. As 
such, the evolution of firm profitability is probably the most relevant indicator to rely on firm 
exit mechanisms. Contrary to other contributions (see Van der Wiel, 1999), we found a 
remarkable similar trend among the three performance indicators in use to corroborate for the 
existence of a shadow of death effect from our data set.  Finally, note that relative labour 
productivity is always negative. This can be thought of as an indication of a systematically 
weaker capital intensity of exiting firms, despite this could also be due to some composition 
effects, as we are discussing about a population of inter-sectoral firms. 
Moreover, those results are quite stable and robust. Table 9 provides the same 
information than the previous ones but the reference population is changed. Instead of using 
the overall mature firms in the sample, we apply a non parametric matching method similar to 
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Almus (2002) and compare exiting firms only to the sub-set of their most similar surviving 
counterparts. Actually, we match firms according to the following start-up characteristics: 
initial firm size, year of entry, industry classification at the 4digit, legal form and the initial 
number of establishments. 
 
Table 9. TFP, Profitability and Size differences by number of years prior to exit   
(with matching) 
Prior to exit 
(in Years) TFP (log) P (lev) S (lev) LP (log) 
10 -0.044 0.839 1.219 -0.176 
9 -0.057 0.802 1.146 -0.167 
8 -0.065 0.761 1.015 -0.154 
7 -0.080 0.706 0.946 -0.163 
6 -0.089 0.671 0.946 -0.176 
5 -0.105 0.664 0.822 -0.191 
4 -0.127 0.619 0.747 -0.221 
3 -0.142 0.527 0.680 -0.254 
2 -0.161 0.445 0.613 -0.287 
1 -0.177 0.308 0.564 -0.311 
0 -0.194 0.206 0.529 -0.326 
Numbers in italics indicate non-significance at 5% level 
The previous results are essentially affected in two ways. First, the matching method 
essentially improves the magnitudes in the decrease of performance of exiting firms, 
especially of their relative TFP growth rates. Second, it improves the significance of the 
results, at least for relative TFP and profitability. Relative size is not affected as far as the 
significance of that indicator is concerned.  
At this stage, further discussion is needed about the relative importance of market 
selection. With regard to our performance indicators, it is noteworthy to emphasise how 
relative TFP to incumbents is not actually useful to discriminate between the population of 
failing and successful entrants in their post-entry behaviours. However, relative TFP gaps are 
significant as far as the pre-exit behaviours of exiting firms is concerned. Therefore, TFP can 
be thought of as a necessary but not sufficient condition to be fulfilled  in order to stay on the 
market and further structural characteristics have also to be considered as far as explaining the 
market selection process is at central stake. In other words, market selection cannot be fully 
explained through a pure productive efficiency analysis.  
Moreover, the existence of a quasi-systematic shadow of death effect can be interpreted 
in a twofold perspective: either it means that market selection is not effective enough and 
allows firms to survive whereas they should have left the market or, that market selection is 
efficient but allows firms to anticipate that they need to leave the market so as they react 
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gradually and adjust downward especially their employment level before actually leaving the 
market (Almus, 2002). Therefore, in the next Section, we focus the discussion about selection 
mechanisms as regards firms’ structural characteristics.  
6. Market Selection and Firm Survival 
6.1. Econometric Specification of the Duration Model 
This Section presents the econometric model used to study the forces driving selection 
mechanisms for the population of firms above 20 employees in French manufacturing in the 
nineties. We estimate a duration model for grouped data following the approach first 
introduced by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978). Suppose there are firms i={1,…,N}, who enter 
the industry at time t=0. The hazard rate function for firm i at time t > 0 and t={1,…,T} is 
assumed to take the proportional hazards form: ( ) ( )βλλ 'exp itoit Xt ⋅= , where ( )toλ is the 
baseline hazard function and Xit is a series of time-varying covariates summarizing observed 
differences between firms. The discrete time formulation of the hazard of exit for firm i in 
time interval t is given by a complementary log logistic function such as 
( ) ( ){ })(expexp1 ' tXXh ititt θβ +−−= , where θ(t) is the baseline hazard function relating the 
hazard rate  at the tth interval with the spell duration (Jenkins, 1995).  ( itt Xh )
This model is the discrete time counterpart of the Cox’s proportional hazard model for 
continuous time (see Meyer, 1990). It can be extended to account for unobserved but 
systematic differences between firms. Suppose that unobserved heterogeneity is described by 
a random variable εi independent of Xit. The proportional hazards form with unobserved 
heterogeneity can now be written as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )iitoitioit XtXt εβλβελλ logexpexp '' +⋅=⋅⋅= . 
Assuming that εi is Gamma distributed with mean one and variance ν, the log-likelihood 
function is written: 
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where ci is an indicator variable taking unity for firms exiting the market, 0 otherwise. The 
parameter ν and β are to be estimated. Note that the proportional hazards form without 
heterogeneity ( ( ) ( )βλλ 'exp itoit Xt ⋅= ) is the limiting case as ν → 0. The relevance of the 
estimated unobserved heterogeneity is tested directly by the significance of parameter ν. 
Besides, we also perform a likelihood ratio test between the unrestricted model (with 
unobserved heterogeneity) and the restricted model (without unobserved heterogeneity). The 
reported estimates are chosen from the LR test.  We use originally two specifications for the 
discrete time proportional hazard model: (i) a flexible parametric specification for the baseline 
hazard function is a polynomial in duration; (ii) a log(time) specification for duration 
dependence, comparable to a Weibull model for continuous time duration models. Because 
the results do not differ significantly, we report the flexible parametric specification only. 
We expect the hazard of exit to depend primarily on firm performance. However, we do 
not expect all performance variables to have a similar effect, depending on whether a firm is 
new to the market (age ≤ 5) or an incumbent (age°> 5). We define firm performance in terms 
of profitability, productivity and size. First, we expect profitability and size to boost survival 
for all types of firms, i.e. to impact negatively on the hazard of exit. The reason for this is that 
profitability is both the utmost condition and the chief objective for firms to survive and 
expand their activities. Additionally, we expect size to play a similar role, allowing us to 
grasp effects such as scale economies (other than those accounted for in the measure of 
productivity), scope economies, and lastly the stability of internally-generated funds, allowing 
large firms to spread the fixed costs of innovative activities into a wider spectrum of sales. 
The role of productivity is more ambiguous. Imagine that market competition for incumbents 
and entrants differ in systematic ways. Following Audretsch et al. (1999), incumbents could 
well compete on prices whereas entrants compete on product in specific market niches. 
Should this depict competition adequately for both entrants and incumbents, one would 
expect productivity to matter essentially on commodity markets, i.e. for incumbents, whereas 
this should not be necessarily the case for entrants. Therefore, we expect productivity to deter 
firm exit for incumbents, i.e. boost firm survival, whereas we expect no particular effect for 
entrants. Lastly, firm age is included as an additional proxy for firm performance.16.  
We include a set of control variables in terms of industry structures and year of entry 
(vintage) which may steer firm exit beyond and above the presumably chief role of firm 
performance. The work of Gort and Klepper (1982), the more recent series of Klepper’s work 
                                                 
16 We also introduce the squared value of age in order to account for possible non linearity in the effect of age on 
the hazard of exit. Although interesting per se and reported below, we use more as a control variable and do not 
intend to comment on such parameters. 
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(1996; 2002) and Argarwal and Audretsch (2001) implies that the dynamics of industry is 
likely to affect firm exit. The stylised fact goes as follows. In early stages of the industry, 
competition is mainly based on product innovation. Both firm entry and firm exit are frequent, 
although entry dominates over exit. When the industry is mature, process innovation 
dominates so that price competition plays a major role in dictating firm exit. One should 
therefore control for such effect. To do so, we follow Mata and Portugal (1994) and define a 
series of additional variables as follows.  First, entry represents a threat for incumbents, so 
that in industries with a high entry rate, we would expect firm lifetime to be shorter, i.e. we 
expect a positive sign on firm exit. We control further for the size of entrants to control for an 
ex post (and indirect) measure of barriers to entry. In industries with a high entrant size, 
barriers to entry are higher so that we expect firm lifetime to be longer (negative sign on firm 
exit). We control for industry structures by measuring the size of the industry (computed as 
the sum of sales by firm belonging to the industry) and the Herfindahl concentration index 
(defined as the sum of the squared market shares). Interpreting them as an indirect measure of 
industry maturity, we expect both measures to relate negatively to firm exit. In addition to 
Mata and Portugal, we compute the mean value of sectoral productivity to control for 
systematic differences in TFP levels across industries. The intuition here is that industries 
with high TFP levels may be associated with high turnover rates, selecting out firms with high 
productivity levels with respect to the rest of the economy. Ignoring this issue could produce 
an over-estimation of the TFP coefficient. Lastly, we control for vintage effects by including a 
series of binary variables indicating entry year. 
In order to estimate the model, it is necessary to re-organise the data set in such a way 
that rather than the firm being the unit of analysis, we use the spells at risk. Entrants at the 
right-hand side of the datasets (year 2002) have been discarded from the analysis. All 
explanatory variables are entered in logs, so that estimated coefficients can be interpreted as 
the change in the discrete hazard rate for one percent change in the associated covariate. 
Because firms may have negative profitability values, we add to the vector of independent 
variable a dummy variable set to unity if the firm witness negative profitability, 0 otherwise, 
setting artificially the log value of their negative profitability to zero.  
6.2. Results on Firm Duration 
Table 10 reports the results for different specifications (Columns 1 to 4) and by decomposing 
the population of firms into incumbents that were operating already in 1984 (the start of the 
dataset) and entrants, that is, firms that have entered the market 1990 or after (Columns 5 and 
6). The objective of such decomposition is to investigate whether the market selection forces 
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operate equally over these two types of firms. All models originally control for unobserved 
heterogeneity as specified above. However, when the estimated variance of εi is not 
significant, Table 10 reports the results from our estimations for the restricted model only. 
Looking at the LR test, we find that the unrestricted models (accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity) is preferred to the restricted specification (without unobserved heterogeneity) 
in 5 of the 6 specifications. Only for incumbents (Column 6) the restricted model is chosen. 
Unobserved heterogeneity is significant in only 3 cases (Columns 1, 3 and 5). Accounting for 
entry cohorts wipes out the effect of parameter ν, suggesting that a great deal of firm specific 
attributes is collinear with the year of entry. We opt for specification (3) for the estimations of 
the determinant of exit by type of firms (Columns 5 and 6). 
Looking first at the whole population (Column 1), we find that both size and 
profitability have a negative impact on the hazard of exit. As stressed earlier, this should be 
expected. Large firms are likely to enjoy stronger financial resources and more stable 
revenues. Second, the effect of profitability on the hazard of exit is particularly large, 
suggesting that the probability of exit is very sensitive to small variations in firm profitability. 
Consistently, firms witnessing negative profitability are more likely to exit the industry.  This 
should come as no surprise: profitable firms ought to remain on the market, whereas small 
departures from profitability may have dramatic consequences for firm survival. These results 
hold strongly across alternative specifications displayed in Columns 2 to 4. 
 
 27
 Table 10. Firm Performance and Hazard of Exit in French Manufacturing 
Discrete Time Duration Model 
Polynomial Baseline Hazard Function 
 ALL ALL ALL ALL   E I 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
TFP (Log) 0.003 0.028 0.016 0.014  0.059 -0.143 
 [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]  [0.024]** [0.058]** 
Size (Log) -0.494 -0.495 -0.427 -0.424  -0.488 -0.341 
 [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]***  [0.019]*** [0.021]***
Profitability (Log) -1.91 -1.933 -1.892 -1.884  -0.165 -0.112 
 [0.143]*** [0.143]*** [0.142]*** [0.143]***  [0.011]*** [0.022]***
Profitability < 0 (Dummy) 0.683 0.665 0.65 0.648  -0.716 0.100 
 [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]***  [0.094]*** [0.193] 
Time -0.056 -0.058 0.105 0.129  0.198 0.537 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.011]***  [0.078]** [0.077]***
Time × Time -0.002 -0.002 -0.011 -0.012  -0.017 -0.036 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***  [0.013] [0.004]***
Number of entrants (Log)  -0.028 0.054 0.037  -0.014 -0.125 
  [0.019] [0.016]*** [0.016]**  [0.023] [0.046]***
Mean size of entrants (Log)  -0.017 0.006 0.003  -0.072 -0.056 
  [0.032] [0.020] [0.041]  [0.036]** [0.060] 
Size of industry (Log)  -0.205 -0.282 -0.265  -0.164 -0.037 
  [0.022]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]***  [0.023]*** [0.052] 
Herfindahl (Log)  0.009 0.042 0.034  0.048 -0.051 
  [0.013] [0.012]*** [0.016]**  [0.009]*** [0.032] 
TFP industry average  0.006 -0.156 -0.118  0.169 0.039 
  [0.054] [0.053]*** [0.054]**  [0.072]** [0.150] 
Age (Log)   -0.589 -0.645  -0.443  
   [0.030]*** [0.033]***  [0.121]***  
Age (Log) * Age (Log)   0.093 0.091  -0.046  
   [0.012]*** [0.016]***  [0.085]  
Cohort No No No Yes  No No 
        
Constant 3.415 7.731 8.062 7.846  6.933 0.504 
 [0.111]*** [0.447]*** [0.378]*** [0.725]***  [0.509]*** [0.998] 
Variance of ν (Log) -13.812 -14.136 -13.599 -14.029  -13.125 -15.162 
  [7.855]* [11.917] [6.654]** [0.000]  [7.551]* [-] 
Log Likelihood -74,589.2 -74,442.1 -73,911.7 -73,848.9  -26,411.3 -11,710.6 
LR test 12,594.8*** 12,595.5*** 12,301.5*** 12,211.2***  4,702.4*** 0.001 
Observations 282,137 282,137 282,137 282,137   71,172 58,947 
We find no significant effect of productivity on the hazard of exit across all specifications 
(Columns 1 to 4). This is consistent with our results on post-entry performance, where we 
find that failing entrants do not have significantly lower levels of total factor productivity. 
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Still, these results are at odds with our descriptive findings on pre-exit performance, where 
exitors’ productivity levels are significantly lower already five years before exit. What is 
happening is that controlling for other variables such as size and profitability wipes out the 
significance of productivity: TFP is neither a significant nor a sufficient explanation for firm 
exit. In fact, one may well conjecture that what is worth exploring is not so much the effect of 
productivity on firm exit. Instead, the investigation of the relationship between profitability 
and productivity, i.e. the causality and its direction, may prove more fruitful.   
In Column (2), we include the vector of variables describing the sectoral characteristics:  
(the log of) the number of entrants; (the log of) the mean size of entrants; (the log of) the size 
of the industry; (the log of) the Herfindahl index and the mean value of sectoral TFP 
(computed as the arithmetic value of the log levels of firm TFP, by year and industry). Across 
all specification, (Columns 2 to 4) the size of industry has a negative effect on the hazard of 
exit. 
There are two alternative, perhaps opposite, interpretations for this. First, large sectors 
(in terms of sales) offer a wide range of unexplored but available market opportunities which 
are yet to be exploited. This would allow all types of firms to benefit from first mover 
advantage from these unexplored niches. It is not clear whether incumbents or entrants are 
better able to seize such opportunities, for this depends on initial sunk costs, barriers to entry, 
the minimum efficient scale and the technological competencies needed to fulfil these niches. 
The second takes the opposite path. In this case, industry size acts as proxy for the 
maturity of industry. With little or no room for additional entrants, all incumbent firms 
operate near or at equilibrium, so that the industry turnover rate is low. Thus the observed 
coefficient could also indicate industry maturity. It is not easy to say which effect dominates, 
but we will come back to this issue when we investigate the stability of the selection 
mechanisms by distinguishing entrants from mature firms. 
Pushing further the analysis of the influence of industry characteristics on market 
selection, we observe a significant and positive effect of the Herfindahl index on the hazard of 
exit. This suggests that concentrated industries boost the selection of firms. This should be 
expected: processes of industrial concentration naturally translate into a lower number of 
firms by boosting firm exit. Lastly, average sectoral TFP, although not significant in Column 
(2), becomes significant and negative in Columns (3) and (4). This is contradictory to the 
observation that sectoral productivity growth is associated with higher firm turnover, i.e. firm 
entry on and firm exit from the market. One possible explanation is that high productivity 
growth rates are associated with many technological opportunities, the exploitation of which 
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could boost firm survival. More generally, our results call for a finer investigation regarding 
the effect of firm performance, industry structures on the hazard of exit, by firm type.  
Columns (5) and (6) display the estimated coefficients for both entrants, defined as 
those firms having entered our dataset between 1990 and 2001, and incumbents, defined as 
those firms that were present from the starting date in 1984. As a consequence, no parameter 
estimate for the effect of age on firm survival is reported for incumbents. Two main results 
emerge from the last two Columns of Table 10. First, if both size and profitability have a 
significant and negative effect on the hazard of exit, we find evidence of a divergent effect of 
productivity on firm exit.17 For incumbents, productivity is negatively associated with the 
hazard of exit, suggesting that for incumbents, moves away from productive efficiency are 
particularly painful and may translate into a lower profitability, and eventually into exit from 
the market. For entrants, our expectation was that TFP would play no particular role for 
entrants. Instead, we find that more productive firms are more likely to exit. This is somewhat 
striking, and our proposed interpretation should be taken with great caution. Imagine that 
entrants position themselves primarily on the high quality end of markets, necessitating 
continuous investment in upstream research and development and more risky positioning on 
the market. In this sense, high initial TFP can be associated with high risk and consequently 
higher hazard exit rates.  
More generally, our findings suggest the existence of a two-tier market structure. The 
first layer is that of rather stable large firms, i.e. incumbents, for which competition is mainly 
based on price competition, implying that departures from productive efficiency may prove 
harmful. Such firms are not very sensitive to market structures18, the reason being that they 
themselves define the bulk of the industry. The negative and significant sign of the number of 
entrants suggest that it is not entry per se that threaten the survival of incumbent firms. It 
rather might be the successful growing adolescents which put threat on mature firms. The 
near significance and negative sign of Herfindahl is worth noting: it could reveal behaviour of 
collusion amongst large firms, which are aimed at prolonging preferential market position, in 
highly concentrated markets. This fine and stable market structure differs from the second, 
more turbulent, layer. Entrants compete on products and are subjugated to industry structures. 
With the exception of the number of entrants, all industry characteristics have a significant 
effect on firm exit. The mean size of entrants and industry size are negatively associated with 
the hazard of exit. This pleads in favour of the idea that large sectors offer a wide range of 
                                                 
17 Interestingly, we note that the significance of TFP is lower that those for size and profitability, implying that 
TFP, although important, is not the prime driver of firm duration.  
18 Only one in five industry variables has a significant impact on incumbent hazard of exit. 
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unexplored market opportunities for entrants principally, boosting their survival rate. Industry 
concentration and the level of productivity of the sector exert a positive influence on the 
probability of exit. This is in line with our prior findings on concentration, with the additional 
insight that entrants are those subject to selection, not incumbents. Likewise, the positive sign 
of sectoral productivity suggests that sectors with high productivity levels are associated with 
a higher turnover rate for entrants, not incumbents.  
Altogether, our findings suggest that several games are played in the same courtyard 
and that selection mechanisms may differ depending on the game. The first game is the one 
played by incumbents among themselves. It relies heavily on price and cost competition for 
commodities with rather stable and well identified competitors and, in this game, selection 
drive out of the market the less efficient firms. The second game is the one played by 
incumbents against new entrants. This game seem to imperfect in nature as failing entrants are 
in average more efficient than surviving incumbents. Finally, a last game is the game played 
by entrants among themselves. Entrants seem to compete on new products rather than to cost-
or price-compete. As a whole, entrants are significantly more affected by industry structures 
and large market offer new opportunities that are primarily seized by entrants. While 
descriptive statistics on post-entry performance shown that failing entrants were less efficient 
than their surviving counterparts, our results on duration models contradict this preliminary 
finding. High initial TFP level my even be an handicap for the survival of new entrants if they 
are the transcription of the involvement of the firms in highly risky activities. 
Conclusion  
In this paper we study how market selection mechanisms have been working on French 
manufacturing goods markets over the last decade. We investigate this issue under the 
hypothesis that the competitive challenges a firm have to face, may change along the different 
stages of its life. On the one hand, young new entrants face the challenge to reveal themselves 
productive enough and/or able to learn fast enough in order to survive to the reactive 
strategies of larger and more powerful incumbents firms. On the other hand, mature firms face 
the challenge to continuously renew their productive capabilities, i.e. to adapt themselves to 
new productive environment. Mature firms which will reveal themselves no more productive 
enough and/or not able to adapt fast enough will loose market shares, shrink and eventually 
exit the market.  
Our empirical investigation led us to the following results. In accordance with most of 
the industrial dynamics literature, we found that, exiting firms, as a whole, display below-
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average performance levels and are significantly smaller than their surviving counterparts. We 
nonetheless found key distinguishable features of exit patterns in discriminating between 
young and mature firms. We found that young exiting firms do not display productivity 
disadvantage relative to incumbent firms. They nonetheless display a small but significant 
productivity gap compared to their surviving counterparts. By contrast, mature exiting firms 
display a large and significant productivity disadvantage relative to their surviving 
counterparts. This gap widens the year of exit but emerges several years prior to their exit. 
More precisely, we find the existence of a “shadow of death” effect for each performance 
indicators in use (relative TFP, profitability and size).   
This later result may reveal that, as far as mature firms are concerned, French markets 
select against persistent bad performers and not against temporary looses of efficiency. 
Interestingly, this stylised fact can however be given two opposite interpretations. On the one 
hand, this may reveal that markets are well-functioning as they evaluate firms on a medium-
run horizon and not on a too short-run horizon. On the other hand, this may reveal a kind of 
inertia if market selection processes work in favour of established firms and against new 
entrants, in the sense that the later ones are more heavily sanctioned than the former ones. We 
finally conclude that micro data from French manufacturing industries show average 
behaviour consistent with a common view of market selection mechanisms favouring the 
most efficient firms. However, the institutions that help markets to rightly operate this 
selection process may be more severe for young firms compared to mature firms.  
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Annex: Main variables for TFP computation 
All nominal output and inputs variables are available at the firm level. Industry level data are 
used for price indexes, worked hours and depreciation rates. 
Output 
Gross output (sales) is deflated using sectoral price indexes published by INSEE (French 
System of National Accounts). 
Labour input 
Labour input is obtained by multiplying the number of effective workers19 by the average 
worked hours available each year at the industry level. This choice has been made because 
there is no data on hours worked in the EAE survey. Note also that a large drop of worked 
hours occurs between 1999 and 2000 because of the specific “French 35 hours policy” (On 
average, worked hours fall from 38.39 in 1999 to 36.87 in 2000). 
Capital input 
Capital stocks are computed from investment and book value of tangible assets20 following 
the traditional perpetual inventory method (PIM): 
t t 1 t 1K (1 ) K I− −= − δ + t  
where δt is the depreciation rate and It is real investment (deflated nominal investment)21. 
Materials 
Materials are deflated using sectoral price indexes published by INSEE (French System of 
National Accounts). 
Labour and capital cost shares 
With w and c standing respectively for wage rate and user cost of capital, 
 represents the total cost of production of firm k at time t. Labour and 
capital cost shares are then respectively given by
= +kt kt kt kt ktCT w L c K
22: 
= k kLk
k
w Ls
CT
 and = k kKk
k
c Ks
CT
 
                                                 
19 The number of effective workers = the number of employees plus the number of outsourced workers minus 
workers taken from other firms.  
20 For each year, we rely on the book values reported at the end of the accounting exercise.   
21 Both investment price indexes and depreciation rates are available at the 2-digit industrial classification. 
22 For simplicity, we make abstraction of temporal indices when this not leads to confusion. 
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To compute the labour cost share, we rely on the variable “labour compensation” in the EAE 
survey. This value includes total wages paid to salaries plus income tax withholding, and is 
used to approximate the theoretical variable .  k kw L
We compute the user cost of capital by using Hall (1988) methodology where the user 
cost of capital (i.e. the rental of capital) in the presence of a proportional tax on business 
income and of a fiscal depreciation formula, is given by23: 
1( )
1
⎛ ⎞−= + − ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
e t I
It t It t IKt
t
zc r pτδ π τ  
where τt is the business income tax in period t and zI denotes the present value of the 
depreciation deduction24 on one nominal unit investment in industry I.  
 
 
                                                 
23 In this equation, we abstract from tax credit allowance.  
24 Complex depreciation formula can be employed for tax purposes in France. To simplify, we choose to rely on 
the usual following depreciation formula:  
1
1
1
(1 )
(1 )
tn
I
I t
t
z
r
δ δ−
−
=
−= +∑  where Iδ is a mean of the industrial deprecation rates on the period 1984-2002 and r  is a 
mean of the nominal interest rate on the period 1990-2002.  
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